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April 21, 1998

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Dear Colleague:


Over the past five years, the Administration has progressively weakened the complex set of rules that limit the export of "dual-use" technologies (i.e., technologies with both military and civilian applications such as communications satellites and high-precision manufacturing tools), making it easier for potential adversaries to acquire them. Of great concern was the Administration's 1995 decision to loosen export regulations on supercomputers (high performance computers which, among other things, can be used to develop and improve nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles). As a result of these loosened regulations, a number of U.S.-built supercomputers were sent to nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia, as well as to China and other countries of proliferation concern.

As a consequence, Congress last year closed many of the loopholes in the President's export control policy. However, recent news reports indicate that the Administration may use the findings of an impending Stanford University report to justify a further weakening of supercomputer export controls. I fully expect this report to be as flawed as an earlier Stanford University report that the Administration cited to justify its loosening of export controls in 1995.

Strong export control policies have *minimal negative effects* on foreign supercomputer sales and *significant positive effects* on U.S. national security. Export controls protect *Americans* by preventing potentially unfriendly nations from obtaining U.S.-built advanced technology. It is illegal for U.S. companies to sell modern tanks to nations that may someday use them against us; why should the policy governing the sales of supercomputers that can develop and enhance nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles be any different?

Considering the high stakes, I hope you will take a moment to read the attached *National Security Report* on this important issue. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Floyd D. Spence
Chairman